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Generating synthetic data using privacy-
preserving models is a promising method
for sharing sensitive data. This paper
proposes to view synthetic data
generation through probabilistic
modeling, which allows the improvement
of data generation by incorporating prior
knowledge into the generativemodel. The
proposed approach allows us to
counteract reduction in quality, which
results from the obfuscation required for
privacy, and as a result produces high-
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2021.100271THE BIGGER PICTURE Open data are a key component of open science. Unrestricted access to datasets
would be necessary for the transparency and reproducibility that the scientific method requires. So far,
openness has been at odds with privacy requirements, which has prohibited the opening up of sensitive
data even after pseudonymization, which does not protect against privacy breaches using side information.
A recent solution for the data-sharing problem is to release synthetic data drawn from privacy-preserving
generativemodels.We propose to interpret privacy-preserving data sharing as amodeling task, allowing us
to incorporate prior knowledge of the data-generation process into the generator model using modern
probabilistic modeling methods. We demonstrate that this can significantly increase the utility of the gener-
ated data.
Proof-of-Concept: Data science output has been formulated,
implemented, and tested for one domain/problemSUMMARYDifferential privacy allows quantifying privacy loss resulting from accession of sensitive personal data.
Repeated accesses to underlying data incur increasing loss. Releasing data as privacy-preserving synthetic
data would avoid this limitation but would leave open the problem of designing what kind of synthetic data.
We propose formulating the problem of private data release through probabilistic modeling. This approach
transforms the problem of designing the synthetic data into choosing a model for the data, allowing also the
inclusion of prior knowledge, which improves the quality of the synthetic data.We demonstrate empirically, in
an epidemiological study, that statistical discoveries can be reliably reproduced from the synthetic data. We
expect the method to have broad use in creating high-quality anonymized data twins of key datasets for
research.INTRODUCTION
The open release of data would be beneficial for research but is
not feasible for sensitive data, for instance, clinical and genomic
data. Since reliably anonymizing individual data entries is hard,
releasing synthetic microdata1 has been proposed as an alterna-
tive. To maximize the utility of the data, the distribution of the
released synthetic data should be as close as possible to that
of the original dataset, but should not contain synthetic exam-
ples that are too close to real individuals, as their privacy couldThis is an open access article undbe compromised. Traditional methods of statistical disclosure
limitation cannot provide rigorous guarantees on the risk.2
However, differential privacy (DP) provides a natural means of
obtaining such guarantees.
DP3,4 provides a statistical definition of privacy and anonymity.
It gives strict controls on the risk that an individual can be iden-
tified from the result of an algorithm operating on personal data.
Formally, a randomized algorithm M is ðε;dÞ-DP, if for all data-
sets X;X0, where X and X0 agree in all but one entry, and for all
possible outputs S of M, it satisfies:Patterns 2, 100271, July 9, 2021 ª 2021 The Authors. 1
er the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
ll
OPEN ACCESS ArticlePrðMðXÞ˛SÞ% eεPrðMðX0Þ˛SÞ+ d; (Equation 1)
where 0%d<1. The non-negative parameters ε; d define the
strength of the guarantee, with smaller values indicating stron-
ger guarantees. Privacy is usually achieved by introducing
noise into the algorithms. DP has many desirable properties,
such as composability: combining the results of several DP al-
gorithms still produces DP, with privacy guarantees depending
on how the algorithms are applied.4,5 Another important prop-
erty of DP is invariance to post-processing6, which ensures
that the privacy guarantees of a DP result remain valid after
any post-processing. Thus we can use the results of a DP algo-
rithm to answer future queries and still have the same privacy
guarantees.
Data-sharing techniques under DP can be broadly separated
into two categories as noted by Leoni7: input perturbation, where
noise is added to the original data to mask individuals, and syn-
thetic microdata, created from generative models learned under
DP. The input perturbation techniques lack generality as they are
often suitable for only very specific types of data, for example,
set-valued data.8 From now on we will focus only on synthetic-
data-based techniques. Using DP for releasing synthetic micro-
data provides a more generalizable solution and was first sug-
gested by Blum et al.9 for binary datasets. Since then, multiple
privacy-preserving data release techniques have been pro-
posed.10–16 However, the methods have so far been limited to
special cases, such as discrete data10,12–15,17 or having to
draw a synthetic dataset from noisy histograms.15,16 More
recent work has employed more powerful models.11,18,19 These
methods have been shown to be much more efficient and gen-
eral compared with previous attempts. However, these
methods, as well as other data-sharing works, share a limitation:
they are not able to use existing (prior) knowledge about the
dataset.
Typically, the data-sharing methods are built around a similar
idea: learn a generative model from the sensitive data under pri-
vacy guarantees and then sample a synthetic dataset from the
trained model. These works differ mainly in the specific model
used and how the model is learned under DP. Now one might
ask, is this not sufficient, if the model is a universal approximator
(such as variational autoencoders in Ács et al.19) and a sufficient
amount of data are used to train it? The answer is yes, in princi-
ple, but in practice the amount of data required may be
completely infeasible, as the universal approximator would
need to learn from the data the structure of the problem, the
causality, and all parameters. All this is made more difficult by
the capacity of the models being more limited under DP and
the necessary tuning of hyperparameters coming with a privacy
cost.
If the human modeler has knowledge of how the data have
been generated, it is much more data efficient to put this knowl-
edge into the model structure than to learn everything from
scratch with general-purpose data-driven models. For example,
the data analyst might want to explicitly model structural zeros,
i.e., zeros that correspond to an impossible outcome due to
other features of the data, e.g., living subjects cannot have a
cause of death. This is where the general purpose models fall
short. Instead of building a new general purpose model for pri-2 Patterns 2, 100271, July 9, 2021vate data sharing, we propose a new essential component to pri-
vate data sharing by augmenting the standard data-sharing
workflow with a modeling task. In this modeling task, the user
can encode existing knowledge of the problem and the data
into the model before the private learning, thus guiding the DP
learning task without actually accessing any private data yet.
We propose to give the modeler the tools of probabilistic
modeling that provide a natural language to describe existing
knowledge about how the data have been generated. This in-
cludes any prior knowledge, which can be seamlessly inte-
grated. In a continuous or high-dimensional data space there
is also another reason probabilistic modeling is needed: finite
datasets are often sparse and require smoothing that preserves
the important properties of the data.
In this paper we formulate the principle of ‘‘Bayesian DP data
release,’’ which employs a generative probabilistic model and
hence turns synthetic data release into a modeling problem.
We demonstrate how the modeling helps in data sharing by us-
ing a general purpose model as a starting point. We will increase
the amount of prior knowledge encoded into the model and
show empirically how the synthetic dataset becomes more
similar to the original onewhenwe guide it withmore prior knowl-
edge. We show how the modeling becomes pivotal in making
correct statistical discoveries from the synthetic data. Code for
applying the principle across model families and datasets is
available at https://github.com/DPBayes/twinify (code for exper-
iments in the paper is available at https://github.com/DPBayes/
data-sharing-examples).RESULTS
Overview of methods used in the experiments
Our aim is to release a new synthetic dataset that preserves the
statistical properties of the original dataset while satisfying DP
guarantees. Consider a dataset X and a probabilistic model











q pðqjXÞ dq; (Equation 2)
to generate the synthetic data. PPD tells us the probability of
observing a new sample conditioned on the data we have ob-
tained thus far. Therefore, if our model sufficiently captures the
generative process, the PPD is the natural choice for generating
the synthetic data. We sample the synthetic data from the PPD,
by first drawing ~q from the posterior distribution pðqjXÞ and then
drawing new data point ~x from the probabilistic model condi-
tioned on ~q, and repeating for all points.
Many of the previous differentially private data-sharing works
share a common workflow, namely, they learn a specific gener-
ative model from the data and share samples drawn from this
generator. This pipeline is depicted in Figure 1.
What we suggest is to augment this pipeline with domain
knowledge of the data holder. This is possible through probabi-
listicmodeling, which gives a natural language for encoding such
knowledge prior to learning. In out experiments, we have used
the new improved pipeline, depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 1. Standard differentially private data-
sharing workflow
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OPEN ACCESSArticleReproducing statistical discoveries from the
synthetic data
In order for private data sharing to be useful, we need to retain
important statistical information in the synthetic data while pre-
venting reidentification of data subjects. Next we will demon-
strate how encoding prior knowledge becomes essential in mak-
ing correct statistical discoveries from the synthetic data.
To test whether the same discoveries can be reproduced from
the synthetic as from the original dataset, we generated a syn-
thetic replica of a dataset used in an epidemiological study20, us-
ing a general-purpose generative model family (mixture model).
Prior to learning, we encoded experts’ domain knowledge about
the data into the probabilistic model.
The data have previously been used to study the association
between diabetes and alcohol-related deaths (ARDs) using a
Poisson regression model.21 The study showed that males and
females exhibit different behaviors in terms of alcohol-related
mortalities. We encoded this prior knowledge into the model
by learning independent mixture models for males and females.
Another type of prior knowledge we had comes from the nature
of the study that produced the data: the data of each subject end
either on a specific date or at death. Hence, the status at the
endpoint is known to have a one-to-one correspondence on
certain features, such as duration of the follow-up and, most
importantly, the binary indicator that tells if an individual died
of alcohol-related causes. We encoded this prior knowledge
into the probabilistic model as well. For details on the models
we refer the reader to the experimental procedures.
After building the model, we learned the generative model un-
der DP and generated the synthetic data. We fit the same Pois-
son regression model that was used in the earlier study21 to the
synthetic data as well, and compared the regression coefficients
of the two models.
From the synthetic data, wemake two key observations. (1) We
can reproduce the discovery that diabetics have a higher risk of
ARD than non-diabetics, which agrees with the previous results
on the original data.21 The bar dubbed ‘‘Stratified’’ in Figure 3
shows that we can reproduce the discoveries with high probabil-
ity for males with relatively strict privacy guarantees (ε = 1). For
females, we need to loosen the privacy guarantees to ε= 4 in or-
der to reproduce the statistical discovery with high probability.
We discuss the difference between males and females in the
next section. (2) To reproduce the discovery, we need to have
the correct model. Figure 3 shows the results of three different
models: ‘‘Stratified,’’ equipped with prior knowledge on gender
and outcome of the follow-up; ‘‘No alive/dead strat.,’’ with prior
knowledge only on gender; and ‘‘Unstratified,’’ without either
type of prior knowledge. We see that the more prior knowledge
we encode into the model, the better reproducibility we get. For
males, with strict privacy (ε = 1) we increase the rate of reproduc-
ibility almost by 40% by having the correct model. For females,
the effect is even stronger; however, it is best visible with larger ε.Performance of DP data sharing
Next wewill demonstrate the usability as well as the limitations of
the proposed general DP data-sharing solution.
DP data sharing works best when data are plentiful
As we saw in Figure 3, the utility is better for males than the fe-
males, especially for strict privacy guarantees. To understand
the difference between the two cases (males, females) in the
ARD study, we note the much smaller sample size for ARD inci-
dences among females (520 versus 2,312). Since DP guarantees
indistinguishability among individuals in the dataset, it is plau-
sible that the rarer a characteristic, the less well it can be pre-
served in DP-protected data. To assess whether this holds for
the regression coefficients in the ARD study, we divided the
regression coefficients, both male and female, into four equal-
sized bins based on how many cases exhibited the correspond-
ing feature and computed the mean absolute error between the
original and the synthetic coefficients within these bins. Figure 4
shows that the regression coefficients with higher numbers of
cases are more accurately discovered from the synthetic data.
Previously, Heikkil€a et al.22 showed that the error of estimating
parameter mean under ðε; dÞ-DP decreases proportional to
Oð1 =nÞ, where n is the size of the dataset. Figure 4 shows that
the error in the ARD study follows closely the expected behavior
as the number of cases increases. In this experiment, the inverse
group size was estimated with the average of the inverse group
sizes within a bin.
However, the data size is not the only determining factor for
the utility of DP data sharing. Next we will show how more
clear-cut characteristics of the data are easier to discover,
even with fewer samples.
Picking up aweak statistical signal is difficult for DPdata
sharing
The ARD study stratifies individuals based on three types of dia-
betes treatment: insulin only, orally administered drug (OAD)
only, and insulin + OAD treatment. Each of these therapies is
treated as an independent regressor. For a reproduced discov-
ery, we require that all of the regressors are positive and have
sufficient statistical significance (p < 0.05). From Figure 5 we
see that the probability of reproducing the discoveries for each
subgroup increases as ε grows. However, we also see that for
the insulin-only subgroup we recover the correct discovery
with higher rate compared with the larger subgroup, OAD only.
The reason the smaller subgroup of insulin only is captured
with sufficient significancemore often than the largest subgroup,
OAD only, can be explained by the original regression coeffi-
cients shown in Table 1. The OAD-only subgroup has a signifi-
cantly smaller effect on the ARD than the insulin-only subgroup,
thus making it more difficult for the mixture model to capture.
However, as we increase ε, the correlation between OAD only
and ARD is more often captured. Both of these effects are also
visible in themale case, as we see from Figure 5, but on a smaller
scale.Patterns 2, 100271, July 9, 2021 3
Figure 2. Bayesian DP data release
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OPEN ACCESS ArticleSome of the regression coefficients learned from the synthetic
data diverge from the ground truth, which seems to also persist
without privacy (see column ε=N in Table 1). In our experiments
we have used a small number ofmixture components (k = 10) as
a compromise between sufficiently high resolution (we canmake
correct statistical discoveries) and private learning that becomes
more difficult as the number of parameters grows. Increasing the
number of mixture components resolves this inconsistency by
improving the fit in the non-private case (see Table S1 in the sup-
plemental information).
To evaluate the strength of the statistical signals in the female
ARD study, we ran the Poisson regression study with bootstrap-
ped original female data. Figure 6 shows that under 100 boot-
strap iterations,z30% of the repeats did not reach the required
statistical significance. This shows that the statistical signal in fe-
male data is weak to begin with, and therefore may be difficult for
a data-sharing model to capture.
Despite DP data sharing having difficulties with weak statisti-
cal signal and limited data, it provides an efficient solution for pri-
vacy-preserving learning, especially when we are not certain
about the future use of the data. Next we will discuss how DP-
based synthetic data stand against traditional query-based DP
approaches.
Performance against a tailored mechanism
As discussed, one of the greatest advantages of releasing a
synthetic dataset is that it can be used in arbitrary tasks without
further privacy concerns. Using traditional DP techniques, a
data holder that wants to allow DP access to a sensitive dataset
needs to set a privacy budget at the desired level of privacy and
split this budget for each access that the data are subjected to.
As soon as the privacy budget runs out, the data cannot be
used in any additional analysis without unacceptable pri-
vacy risk.
We will next show that the data-sharing methods can outper-
form traditional DP techniques, if the data are to be accessed
multiple times. We evaluate the performance on two datasets,
a mobile phone app dataset23 referred to as Carat and the pub-
licly available set of US census data, ‘‘Adult’’.24 As data-sharing
methods we apply a mixture-model-based PPD sampling
method (‘‘mixture model’’) and a Bayes-networks-based
method, PrivBayes25 (‘‘Bayes network’’).
Consider that the data holder splits the budget uniformly
among T anticipated queries. Figure 7 illustrates how the number
of anticipated queries will affect the accuracy. We compared the
data-sharing method against perturbing the covariance matrix4 Patterns 2, 100271, July 9, 2021with Gaussian noise, according to the
Gaussian mechanism3 (‘‘tailored mecha-
nism’’). We measured the accuracy in
terms of the Frobenius norm (see Equa-
tion 8) between the true and the DP covari-
ancematrices. Already with T = 10 queries,
releasing a synthetic dataset outperforms
the tailored mechanism for these high-
dimensional data. We show results only
for the mixture model because the differ-ence in performance between the mixture model and the Bayes
networks is small in this example (see Figure 8).
As another example, we compared the synthetic data release
on the Adult data against a private logistic regression classifier.26
Figure 7 shows that the Bayes network consistently outperforms
the tailored mechanism, and for strict privacy requirement (small
ε) themixturemodel also performs better than the tailoredmech-
anism, given 20 or more queries.
Demonstration on two parametric families of
distributions
Finally, we will demonstrate the results from two data-sharing
approaches using two very different universal probabilistic
models making different computational trade-offs. We evaluate
the performance between mixture models and Bayes networks
on the ARD, Carat, and Adult datasets.
For theCarat data, Figure 8, left, shows that the Bayes network
is accurate when the dimensionality of the data is low, but as the
dimensionality grows, synthetic data generated from the mixture
model achieve higher accuracy than data from Bayes networks,
which also become computationally exhausting as the dimen-
sion increases. From Figure 8, we can see that learning the
mixture model takes only a fraction of the Bayes networks’
computational time. Similarly, in the ARD study, the mixture
models outperforms Bayes networks (Figure 8, right).
As a final comparison between the Bayes networks and the
mixture model, we compared the two in the previously intro-
duced classification task using the Adult dataset, which has
fewer samples compared with ARD and Carat data (Adult
30,162 samples, Carat 66,754 samples, ARD females 208,148
samples, and ARD males 226,372). After the generative model
was learned, we used the synthetic data obtained from the
generative model to train a logistic regression classifier and
demonstrated the performance by predicting income classes.
Figure 7, right, illustrates that in this example, the Bayes net-
works outperform the mixture model in terms of classification
accuracy.
DISCUSSION
Dwork et al.27 showed theoretically that there is no computation-
ally efficient DP method for data sharing that would preserve all
properties of the data. They consider the problem from the
learning theory perspective, where the aim is to accurately
answer a set of queries. Accurate answers become infeasible
as the size of this query set grows. However, if we need only to
Figure 3. ARD study: Encoding prior knowl-
edge into the generative model improves per-
formance
For both males (left) and females (right), we recover
the correct statistical discovery with high probability
when we guide the model sufficiently with prior
knowledge. The prior knowledge is increased from
right to left in both groups. In ‘‘Stratified,’’ we have
independent mixture models for the genders and
deterministic features due to study outcomes. In
‘‘No alive/dead strat.’’ we have independent models
for the genders, and in ‘‘Unstratified’’ we treat
all features within a mixture component as independent. For a reproduced discovery, we required the association between ARD and medication type to be found
for all medication types with significance (p < 0.05). The results of 100 independent repeats of each method with three levels of privacy (parametrized by ε)
are shown.
ll
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queries wewant to accurately answer stays bounded in size, giv-
ing a way out. We argue that it would already be highly useful to
be able to answer questions of the important properties; and
moreover, the bigger picture may be more relevant than all the
unique characteristics in the data.
As we saw in the Adult example, the DP data release can
perform as well as the tailored mechanism, even when
answering just one query, and progressively better for multiple
queries. However, as our experiments exemplify, encoding of
the prior knowledge has a significant impact on the results. In
fact, what we are proposing is to transform the DP data release
problem into amodeling problem, which includes as an essential
part the selection of the model according to the data and task,
and bringing in available prior knowledge.
We illustrated in Figure 4 how increasing the number of rele-
vant samples improves the results. As is common with all differ-
entially private methods, the data release works better when theFigure 4. Accuracy of findings from synthetic data as a function of
their rarity: ARD study
The accuracy of regression coefficients learned from synthetic data rapidly
improves as the number of relevant samples grows. The solid curves show
mean absolute error within a prevalence bin between the regression co-
efficients learned from original and synthetic data. The average result over 100
independent runs of the algorithm is shown. The dashed line is proportional to
the expected behavior of an optimal estimator (see text); note the different
scale on the y axis (shown on the right). Results are from the stratified model.
Tick marks on the x axis are (min, max) number of relevant samples within the
respective bin. Error bars denote the standard error of the mean. Results
shown are for three values of the privacy parameter ε.original dataset has a large number of samples. This is because
of the nature of DP; it is easier to mask the contribution of one
element of the dataset when the number of samples is large.
Recently, Karwa et al.28 showed that DP has a broadening ef-
fect on the confidence intervals of statistical quantities learned
under DP. Their proof was for Gaussian mean estimation; how-
ever, intuitively, this property should translate to other differen-
tially private tasks as well. The width of the confidence intervals
depends on both the required level of privacy and the number of
samples. This suggests that we should not expect to necessarily
reproduce all the same discoveries under DP.
In the past, there has been discussion on whether standard
random number generators (RNGs) can be used to ensure
DP.29 In the actual data release setting we would need to
consider using cryptographically secure RNGs to properly pro-
vide individuals in the dataset the DP guarantees. Also, the
limited accuracy of floating point arithmetics makes it possible
for an attacker to break DP due to errors in approximation.30
However, these problems are by no means specific to DP data
release but apply to all DP methods.
One major question for all DP algorithms is how to set the pri-
vacy parameters ε and d. While the parameters are in principle
well defined, their interpretation depends, for example, on the
chosen neighborhood relation. Furthermore, the parameters
are worst-case bounds that do not fully capture, for example,
the fact that we do not release the full generative model but
only samples drawn from the PPD. Our use of εz1 is in line
with widely accepted standards derived from observed feasi-
bility of membership inference attacks. Given the complicated
relationship between the released and the original data, it seems
unlikely that the privacy of specific data subjects could be
compromised in this setting under this privacy level.
In this work, we have reformulated the standard differentially
private data sharing by formulating it as a modeling task. Using
probabilistic modeling, we can express prior knowledge about
the data and processes that generated the data before the
training, thus guiding the model toward the right directions
without additional privacy cost. This makes it possible to extend
the DP data sharing solution to datasets that are of limited size,
but for which there exists domain knowledge.
Differentially private data sharing shows great potential, and
would be particularly useful for datasets that will be used in
multiple analyses. Census data are a great example of such
data. Also, as private data sharing allows arbitrary downstreamPatterns 2, 100271, July 9, 2021 5
Figure 5. The statistical signal is weaker in female data (ARD study)
(Left) Likelihood of reproducing findings as a function of privacy guarantee, female case. The statistical discoveries are reliably reproduced from the synthetic data
for the strictest privacy requirements. Results are for the combined case and each subgroup separately. In the combined results, all subgroups are required to
have the correct sign and p < 0.05 to call the discovery reproduced. The size of each subgroup is shown in parentheses. Results are from the stratified model.
(Right) Likelihood of reproducing findings from synthetic data. For males (226,372 samples), the discoveries can be reproduced with high probability from the
synthetic data. For females (208,148 samples), the probability of reproducing discoveries is lower. Bars show discoveries for each type of diabetes medication
separately and for all combined. In the combined case, for a reproduced discovery, we required the association between ARD andmedication type to be found for
all medication types with significance (p < 0.05). The results of 100 independent repeats of the method with privacy level ðε = 1:0; d = 106Þ using the stratified
model are shown.
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OPEN ACCESS Articletasks with no further privacy cost, it is a good alternative for
tasks for which there is no existing privacy-preserving
counterpart.
Our results demonstrate the importance of guiding the data-
sharing task with prior knowledge about the data domain, and
that when this prior knowledge is encoded into the probabilistic
model, the synthetic data maintain the usability of the original
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Materials availability
Synthetic datasets generated for the publicly available Adult dataset can be re-
quested from the authors.
Data and code availability
The code used in our experiments is available at https://github.com/DPBayes/
data-sharing-examples.Table 1. ARD study
Coefficient Number of cases Original coefficient ± SE ε =
Females
OAD only 254 0.657 ± 0.108 0.
OAD + insulin 12 0.873 ± 0.304 0.
Insulin only 117 1.68 ± 0.135 0.
Males
OAD only 1,052 0.435 ± 0.049 0.
OAD + insulin 66 0.582 ± 0.129 0.
Insulin only 480 1.209 ± 0.063 1.
The magnitude of the statistical effect in the male case is well preserved in s
100 runs, with error denoting the standard deviation. The error in the origin
6 Patterns 2, 100271, July 9, 2021The Adult dataset is available from the UCI machine learning repository
(https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult).
The ARD and Carat datasets contain personal information and therefore are
not publicly available.
Regarding the Carat data gathering process, the user was informed about
the data gathering and the research usage of the data (including app data)
when installing the application in the End-User License Agreement. The pro-
cess complies with EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. The app requires
user consent for the installation. The developers have IRB (ethical board)
approval for the Carat data gathering and analysis. An anonymized subset of
Carat data can be found at https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/group/carat/data-
sharing/.
The ARD data were a collection from multiple sources: Social Insurance
Institute (SII; permission Kela 16/522/2012), the Finnish Cancer Registry, Na-
tional Institute for Health and Welfare (THL/264/5.05.00/2012), and Statistics
Finland (TK-53-214-12). This is a register-based study with pseudonymous
data and no patient contact, thus no consents from pseudonymized patients
were required according to Finnish law. The ethical committee of the Faculty
of Medicine, University of Helsinki, Finland (02/2012) reviewed the protocol.
Data permits were received from the SII (16/522/2012), the National Institute
for Health and Welfare (THL/264/5.05.00/2012), and Statistics Finland (TK-
53-214-12). The SII pseudonymized the data.1.0 ε = 2.0 ε = 4.0 ε = N
303 ± 0.197 0.474 ± 0.209 0.591 ± 0.189 0.887 ± 0.149
658 ± 0.516 0.846 ± 0.44 1.074 ± 0.427 1.124 ± 0.366
91 ± 0.379 1.085 ± 0.312 1.313 ± 0.293 1.521 ± 0.206
412 ± 0.166 0.502 ± 0.152 0.538 ± 0.12 0.532 ± 0.089
748 ± 0.304 0.816 ± 0.282 0.858 ± 0.234 0.864 ± 0.17
033 ± 0.189 1.188 ± 0.205 1.257 ± 0.138 1.262 ± 0.123
ynthetic data. DP and synthetic non-DP (ε = N) results are averaged over
al coefficients shows the standard error for the regression model.
Figure 6. ARD study
The statistical signal is weak in the female data, and discoveries cannot be
made with sufficient significance. On the left, the bars show results for private
synthetic data with ε= 1:0 of 100 independent runs using the stratified model.
On the right, the bars show results for 100 times bootstrapped original data.
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For the ARD study20, the data came from 208,148 females and 226,372
males and comprised three continuous, five binary, and two categorical
features.
Carat23 is a research project that maintains a mobile phone app that helps
users understand their battery usage. For the Carat dataset, we obtained a
subset of Carat data from the research project. Our aim was to privately
release a dataset that consists of installed apps of 66,754 Carat users. To
have some variance in the data, we dropped out the 100 most popular apps
that were installed on almost every device and used the 96 next most popular
apps to subsample in the experiments.
In the Adult study of the UCI machine learning repository,24 we trained the
generative model with 30,162 samples with 13 features of both continuous
and discrete types. A separate test set consisted of 15,060 instances, of which
75.4% were labeled %50k$.
Differential privacy
In our experiments, we used approximate DP, as defined below.
Definition 1 (approximate DP3): a randomized algorithm M : XN/ I sat-
isfies ðε; dÞ DP, if for all adjacent datasets X;X0˛XN and for all measurable
S3I it holds that:
PrðMðXÞ˛SÞ% eεPrðMðX 0Þ˛SÞ+ d: (Equation 3)
We consider datasets as adjacent in the substitute relation, i.e., if we get one
by replacing a single element of the other and vice versa. The privacy param-mixture-model-based data release ismore accurate for multiple queries and tighte
runs is shown. Error bars denote standard error of mean.eter d used in the experiments was set to 106 for the ARD study and 105 for
both the Carat and the Adult studies.
Probabilistic models
Mixture model
Mixture model is a universal approximator of densities. The probability density











It allows the capture of complex dependency structures through the differ-
ences between less complex mixture components (the densities pðXqðkÞÞ).
There is no limitation on what kinds of distributions can be used for the mixture
components, and thus amixture model is suitable for arbitrary types of data. In
this work we assume independence of features within each mixture compo-
nent. This means that the component distribution factorizes over the features,















where Xj ; j = 1;.;D denotes the D features of the data and q
ðkÞ
j the parameters
associated with the jth feature of the kth component distribution. Intuitively the
problem can be seen as finding clusters of features such that each cluster has
an axis-aligned covariance structure. As the number of such clusters in-
creases, we can cover the data more accurately.
In our experiments with mixture models, we used PPD as the generative
model. The only access to data is through the posteriors of the model param-
eters, which we learned under DP using the differentially private variational
inference (DPVI) method.26 DPVI learns a mean field approximation for the
posterior distributions of model parameters using DP-SGD.31 The number of
mixture components K was set to 10 for data with fewer dimensions (<20)
and to 20 for data with more dimensions (R20). If necessary, this number,
along with hyperparameters of DPVI, could be optimized under DP32, with
potentially significant extra computational cost.
Bayes networks
A Bayes network is a graphical model that presents the dependencies across
random variables as a directed acyclic graph. In the graph, the nodes repre-
sent random variables and the edges dependencies between the variables.
To learn the graphs privately and to sample the synthetic data, we used the
PrivBayes method,25 which builds the graph between the features of the
data, and no additional latent variables were assumed. The topology of the
network is chosen under DP by using the exponential mechanism,33 and the
conditional distributions that describe the probability mass function are
released using the Laplace mechanism.4
Model details
For the mixture model, we need to choose how to model each feature in the
datasets. In all our experiments we used the following distributions: contin-
uous features were scaled to the unit interval andmodeled as beta distributed.Figure 7. Performance against tailored
mechanisms
(Left) Carat study. The data-sharing method out-
performs the tailored mechanism as the number of
anticipated future queries (T) grows, in terms of
classification accuracy. Curves show the Frobenius
norm between original and synthetic covariance
matrices. Privacy budget was fixed to ð1:0; 105Þ.
The average of 10 runs is shown. Error bars denote
the standard error of mean. (Right) Adult study.
Synthetic data from the Bayes network model
outperform the tailored mechanism. While a tailored
mechanism is more accurate for loose privacy
guarantees (large ε) and few queries (small T), the
r privacy guarantees. The average classification accuracy over 10 independent
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Figure 8. Comparing mixture model and
Bayes networks using two different datasets
(Left) Accuracy and computation speed of two
models in generating synthetic data (Carat study).
For low-dimensional discrete data, Bayes networks
are good, but as dimensionality grows, their
computation time becomes intolerable and mixture
models become more accurate. The solid lines
denote the mean Frobenius norm (see Equation 8)
between the original and the synthetic covariance
matrices, with error bars denoting standard error of
the mean from 10 independent runs of the algo-
rithm. The dashed lines show the run times. Privacy
budget was fixed to ðε = 1:0; d = 105Þ. (Right)
Accuracy of data synthesized with two models (ARD study). Mixture models preserve regression coefficients better than the Bayes network. The curves show
mean absolute error between the original and the learned coefficients. The average over 100 runs is shown. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
ll
OPEN ACCESS ArticleThe parameters for beta-distributed variables were given a gammað1; 1Þ prior.
Discrete features were modeled as either Bernoulli or categorical random vari-
ables based on the domain. In both Bernoulli and categorical cases, the pa-
rameters were given a uniform prior. Table 2 summarizes the mixture models
used in the experiments.
Prior knowledge used in the ARD study
In the ARD study, we showed how incorporating prior knowledge into the
model improves the utility of data sharing. Next we will describe in detail the
type of knowledge we used to model the data. We will encode the prior knowl-
edge into the mixture model given in Equation (5). This corresponds to the
model referred to as ‘‘Unstratified’’ in Figure 3.
We start by splitting the probabilistic model based on gender of the subject.







qðkÞ; xsex: (Equation 6)
We refer to this model as ‘‘No alive/dead strat.’’
The ARD data are an aggregate of a follow-up study, which ended either on
December 31, 2012, or on the subject’s death. In this study, wewere interested
in whether an individual died due to alcohol-related reasons. Since the subject
cannot be dead due to alcohol-related reasons while still continuing to the end
of the follow-up, we separated the model according to subjects’ status by the
end of the follow-up. This led to the final ‘‘Stratified’’ model used in our exper-






qðkÞ; xdead; xsex: (Equation 7)
Here, xdead denotes the end-of-follow-up indicator and X fdeadg the features
of the data excluding the end-of-follow-up indicator. Now we could learn two
mixturemodels, one for living and the other for dead subjects, for both femalesTable 2. Summary of mixture model details





for males and females
and separation based
on outcome of the follow-up
Carat 20 binary within a mixture component,





separate mixture models for
high/low income; ‘‘hours per week,’’
‘‘capital loss,’’ and ‘‘capital gain’’
features were discretized into 16 bins
8 Patterns 2, 100271, July 9, 2021and males. Since the living subjects stayed in the study until the end of the
follow-up, we could model the feature pair (‘‘start date’’ and ‘‘duration of
follow-up’’) using just one of the features. In our experiments we used the
‘‘start date’’ feature. Similar to the ARD, as death could occur only in dead sub-
jects, we could remove this feature from the living model.
Similarity measures
In the Carat experiments, we measured the performance in terms of the sim-
ilarity between the covariance matrices of the original and the synthetic












Supplemental information can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
patter.2021.100271.
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